


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28 April 1988



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# ***JPRS Report***



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# Arms Control

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**Prospects 'Gloomy' for START Accord at U.S.-Soviet Moscow Summit**

*OW141057 Beijing in Russian to the USSR  
1800 GMT 8 Apr 88*

[News Analysis: "USSR-U.S. Moscow Summit Meeting and Strategic Nuclear Arms Treaty", from "International Events Review" program]

[Text] U.S. President Reagan recently made an official announcement that from May 29 to June 2, he will hold the fourth meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow. A strategic nuclear arms reduction of 50 percent will be the main point on the agenda at the Moscow meeting between Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. Observers of different countries attentively follow the question whether an agreement on this issue will be reached at this meeting.

For a long time, the two superpowers have repeatedly declared that strategic arms reduction was their goal and had preferential significance. However, U.S. and Soviet strategic interests depend on strategic nuclear arms. The strategic nuclear arms talks are much more difficult and complex than the intermediate-range missiles talks. After the leaders of both countries signed the INF Treaty last December both sides intensified the talks on this question, so that the two countries' leaders could sign this agreement at the Moscow meeting. As for now, the two countries' ministers of foreign affairs have already held two rounds of talks and two further rounds of talks have been set for April and May.

The ninth round of arms control talks between the two countries began as early as mid-January. In addition, a meeting of the two countries' ministers of defense was held in March. According to reports, great progress in this question has already been achieved between the USSR and United States. The sides agreed to mutually reduce strategic nuclear arms by 50 percent including some important figures. Strategic delivery vehicles should be reduced to 1600 units carrying 6,000 weapons. The sides agreed to establish a limit of 4,900 units for the sum total of ballistic missile warheads, within the combined total of 6,000 weapons and a sublevel of 1,500 warheads was specified for heavy missiles.

There are still a number of unsolved questions between the two sides relating to strategic arms; for example, the number of bomber-based cruise missiles.

The international public thinks that the two sides will not easily make great concessions in the question of reducing strategic nuclear arms by 50 percent. The public believes the signing of an agreement is not very feasible, because there is not much time left for this.

After the March meeting in Washington of the U.S. and USSR ministers of foreign affairs, the differences between the United States and Soviet Union on strategic nuclear arms reduction remain rigid. President Reagan

did not change his tough position regarding the Star Wars program. He also declared that too little time remains before the May-June Moscow meeting with Gorbachev to complete the work on the conclusion of the strategic arms agreement. In addition, the arguments within the U.S. Government concerning the signing of this treaty continue to intensify and this complicates the talks.

Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Administration, noted at a recent Moscow briefing that the American side proposes stipulations and the idea that it is better to have no agreement than to have a bad one. The 1 April issue of the Soviet weekly NOVOYE VREMYA carries an observer's commentary that also suggests that it would be difficult to work out a draft agreement by the end of May, the eve of President Reagan's visit to the USSR. Although Soviet leader Gorbachev declared 5 April that there is a chance to reach an agreement between the U.S. and USSR, he, nevertheless he did not say if the U.S. and USSR will be able to work out a draft agreement before the next summit meeting. This shows that the prospects for concluding a strategic nuclear arms agreement at the Moscow summit meeting are gloomy.

However, some other observers have noted that with development of the economic, political, and military situation in the two countries and through fierce bargaining both sides may make concessions and a treaty on strategic nuclear arms reduction will probably be concluded, or an essential agreement signed.

**Prospects for Strategic Nuclear Treaty Analyzed**

*OW220504 Beijing XINHUA in English  
0135 GMT 22 Apr 88*

[“News Analysis: Is Strategic Nuclear Treaty on Schedule?” by Jing Wuwu—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Beijing, April 21 (XINHUA)—Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan declared after their meeting in Washington last December that negotiators for both countries would do their utmost to reach an early agreement on reducing offensive strategic nuclear weapons and said they hoped to sign a treaty in the first half of this year during their fourth meeting in Moscow.

Whether the draft treaty can be produced on time will be determined to a great extent by coming talks between U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

The treaty's framework was worked out during the Washington summit. Both sides agreed to cut offensive strategic nuclear weapons by half and reduce the numbers of their nuclear weapons carriers and warheads to 1,600 and 6,000 respectively. They even appeared to agree on a breakdown list of how many weapons of each type would be permitted by each of the superpowers.

And ultimately, they also decided they would be able to work out detailed rules for verifying the implementation of such a treaty on the basis of the verification methods for the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty.

However, many problems remained. For instance, would land-based intercontinental mobile ballistic missiles be prohibited? And how would long-distance cruise missiles that can be carried by heavy bombers be classified in the breakdown?

During the Washington summit, Reagan abruptly changed the U.S. position and promised to restrict the number of America's sea-based cruise missiles. However, an actual reduction in these missiles will be difficult to verify since they can be launched both by warships on the sea and submarines under the sea, and they can be armed with both nuclear warheads and non-nuclear warheads.

Besides, quite a number of key issues still remain unsolved in the relationship between strategic nuclear weapons and space weapons.

Some headway, but no major breakthroughs, were reported during talks in Geneva in the past few months and in two meetings of the foreign ministers in Moscow and Washington. Three draft protocols dealing with verification were worked out in March by Shultz and Shevardnadze, but it is said that there are still "up to 100 blanks" yet to be filled in.

The two sides also came close at that March meeting to an accord on the issue of ground-based mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles. Shultz said the U.S. would give up its demand for a complete prohibition of such missiles if a reliable means of verification could be found. However, so far, the U.S. regards the verification plan put forward by the Soviets as "unreliable."

The Soviet stand on sea-based cruise-type missiles is that these are to be covered by the treaty-mandated reduction of 50 percent. The U.S., however, holds a two-to-one advantage in these missiles, and it originally opposed any restrictions on them on verification grounds. It now agrees to include the cruise missiles in the cut, but again, no verification procedure has been found acceptable by both sides.

The U.S. and USSR are even further apart on air-based long-distance cruise missiles. They failed to agree on what range of cruise missiles should be defined in the reduction and by what standard the warheads carried by each heavy bomber would be numbered.

As for the relationship between strategic nuclear weapons and space weapons, the Soviet Union accepted a U.S. proposal that an agreement on space weapons can be reached separately from the one on strategic nuclear weapons. But the essence of the contradictions invoked by Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) still remains.

The position of the Soviet Union now on the SDI is that the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty already prohibits both sides from testing and deploying defensive weapons in space.

The United States has said it will comply with the ABM treaty in a prescribed period of time, but it still seeks explicit accommodation from the Soviet Union for limited testing and manufacturing of some of the weapons in space.

All these problems have to be resolved before the signing of a strategic weapons treaty. Whether or not the treaty can be prepared in the month before the next summit depends for the great part on whether Shultz and Shevardnadze can compromise their positions sufficiently to make another breakthrough.

## JAPAN

### Diet Members Condemn Iraq Chemical Weapon Use

52600040 Tokyo KYODO in English  
0537 GMT 7 Apr 88

[Text] Tokyo, 7 Apr (KYODO)—A group of Japanese Diet members promoting friendship with Iran held a meeting Thursday and adopted a statement denouncing Iraq for allegedly using chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war.

The Dietmen's League for Japan-Iran Friendship, led by former Education Minister Masayuki Fujio said it is horrified to hear that many civilians were killed or wounded by Iraqi chemical arms in mid-March.

More than 10,000 Iranian and Iraqi civilians were reportedly killed or wounded by the Iraqi attacks.

The league urged Iran and Iraq to stop fighting and cited a U.S. Security Council resolution to that effect, a league spokesman said.

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## INTRABLOC

### Pact Experts Discuss Disarmament

**Group Meets in Budapest April 14-15**  
*LD152008 Budapest MTI in English  
1903 GMT 15 Apr 88*

[Text] Budapest, April 15 (MTI)—The experts' work group of the Warsaw Treaty member states dealing with the reduction of European armed forces and conventional weapons held its session in Budapest April 14-15. Participants discussed issues related to the future talks, and measures to strengthen European confidence and security, and issues related to the conference dealing with disarmament.

The experts reviewed the state of consultations in progress in Vienna between the representatives of the Warsaw Treaty and 23 NATO member states on working out the mandate for talks related to European armed forces and conventional weapons.

### Meeting Ends

*LD160912 Prague Domestic Service in Slovak  
0600 GMT 16 Apr 88*

[Text] Hungary—A session of a working group of experts of the Warsaw Pact member states on issues concerning the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe has ended in Budapest.

On the agenda of the meeting were problems linked with the future talks on these issues and with the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

The experts also discussed the course of the Vienna consultations on working out a mandate for the talks on reducing armed forces and conventional armaments between the representatives of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic alliance.

## BULGARIA

### Update on Vienna CSCE Meeting

**Foreign Minister Mladenov Speaks at Vienna CSCE Meeting**  
*AU151535 Sofia BTA in English 1330 GMT 15 Apr 88*

[“Bulgarian Foreign Minister Before the Vienna Meeting”—BTA Headline]

[Excerpts] Vienna, April 15 (BTA)—Today, Bulgaria's Foreign Minister Mr Petur Mladenov acquainted the participants in the Vienna meeting with the results of the Sofia session of the foreign ministers committee of the Warsaw Treaty member-states, with the joint assessment of the international situation and with the programme,

(?adopted) at the session, for real disarmament, decrease of the military confrontation, guaranteeing stability and security in Europe and in the world.

We are ready, said he, to discuss together with all European states, the U.S.A and Canada, each separate element of the programme, as well as to view new proposals, to search together a reasonable and concrete mutually acceptable balance of interests.

Pointing as an example in this respect the Soviet-American INF Treaty, Mr Petur Mladenov stressed the need of completing the work on the agreement for a 50 percent reduction of the strategic offensive weapons at strict adherence to the IBM treaty.

Pointing out the inadmissibility of the so called “compensation measures” for the nuclear weapons due to be destroyed, the Bulgarian foreign minister paid attention to the measures of good will undertaken by the socialist countries before the entering into force of the Soviet-American treaty, the proposal for separate negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons, the working out of convention for a ban on chemical weapons by the end of this year.

Pointing out that the task for reduction of military forces and conventional weapons in Europe is coming to the foreground, Minister Mladenov stressed that the most important thing is that the negotiations should not remain at their starting point, nor should they repeat the sad experience of the past but the mandate should be coordinated and the talks started. In this connection each of the two alliances should publish, as soon as possible, data about their forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, as well as their own data about the forces of the other side. And what is more it would be better to publish data about the regions as well: central Europe, the northern and the southern part of the continent. The Warsaw Treaty member-states are ready to publish data about the separate countries and about the different kinds of weapons, if NATO makes the same.

The delegations in Vienna were informed also of the positive assessment given by the ministers of foreign affairs of the Warsaw Treaty member-states, to the Belgrade meeting.

Further on the Bulgarian foreign minister dwelled on the work of the Vienna meeting. Our joint ascertainment, said he, is that it starts to go out of the stalemate but along with that a number of essential questions continue to remain un-coordinated and they could unjustifiably delay the completion of the meeting. Now, in Vienna, the documents are worked out in a new situation, when the East-West relations start to form under the sign of the new political thinking. At the meeting, as well as outside the meeting, this process is going on in the conditions of difficult overcoming of prejudices and stereotypes accumulated by the past.

Bulgaria's foreign minister said that he was assigned to reiterate the readiness of the states, represented at the session of the committee, for all around cooperation for the drafting of a rich in content and balanced conclusive document.

He dwelled on the tasks which should be resolved by the Vienna meeting: endorsement of the ten principles of the conclusive act in their unity and entity, resuming of the Conference on Confidence Building Measures and Security and on Disarmament in Europe, and the development of a new generation of measures which could be spread over the Mediterranean in particular, starting of negotiations on conventional disarmament. The subject of these negotiations—armed forces and conventional weapons—should not exclude the dual capable delivery vehicles.

The existing asymmetry and disbalance in Europe as well as in the different regions, should be eliminated on a mutual basis.

In conclusion Mr Peter Mladenov informed the participants in the meeting of the proposal to close the Vienna conference at the level of foreign ministers. This would make it possible to exchange opinions on issues of the further promotion of the CSCE process.

#### Further Report on Speech

AU200710 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian  
16 Apr 88 p 4

[Report on speech delivered by Foreign Minister Petur Mladenov at the CSCE conference in Vienna on 15 April]

[Excerpts] Foreign Minister Petur Mladenov spoke at the conference of CSCE member states, which resumed in Vienna today.

He briefed the participants on the results of the Sofia session of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee and their joint evaluation of the international situation, as well as on the program they adopted for real disarmament, reducing the level of military confrontation, and guaranteeing stability and security in Europe and throughout the world. Petur Mladenov declared: We are prepared to discuss each separate element of the program with all European states, the United States, and Canada, and to review new proposals and search together for a sensible and concrete mutually acceptable balance of interests.

The Soviet-American INF Treaty is an example of this and represents the specific implementation of new political thinking. It is necessary to accomplish the next step—namely to complete work on the 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons while strictly observing the ABM Treaty so that the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States may place their signatures under this document at their forthcoming meeting in Moscow.

Pointing out the unacceptability of the so-called "compensation measures" for the nuclear weapons due to be destroyed, Petur Mladenov called attention to the measures of goodwill adopted by the socialist countries—such as the withdrawal of Soviet operational-tactical missiles prior to the coming into force of the Soviet-American treaty, the proposal on individual negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons, as well as the proposal to prepare a convention on the banning of chemical weapons by the end of 1988.

The Bulgarian minister of foreign affairs further pointed out that the task of reducing armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe, which is the most important problem for our continent, is now emerging as an issue of primary importance. It is a good sign that the other European states share the same opinion on this issue. The main thing is that the negotiations should not remain at their starting point, nor should they repeat the sad experience of the past. The mandate should be coordinated and the talks started. In this connection it is proposed that each of the two military alliances should publish as soon as possible data on its forces in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, as well as its own data on the forces of the other side. In addition, data should be published according to region as follows: for Central Europe, and for the northern and southern parts of the continent. The Warsaw Pact member states are prepared to publish data on the separate countries, as well as on types of weapons, provided that NATO does the same.

In the context of regional initiatives Petur Mladenov briefed the participants in the Vienna forum on the positive assessment of the Belgrade meeting made by the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers. This meeting was cited as an example of political goodwill to develop cooperation, overcome prejudice, and search for the things that we have in common as confirmation of the possibility of working successfully on a regional level and as confirmation of the role played by small and medium-sized countries.

The speaker stated: The results of the Belgrade meeting were welcomed with particular satisfaction in Bulgaria. This is a first step along a new path that has been called upon to assist and consolidate the positive trends in the political atmosphere of this particular part of Europe.

The foreign minister also spoke about the work of the Vienna conference. He stated: It is our common assessment that this conference has begun to move out of the stalemate. At the same time there are a number of essential questions that have not yet been coordinated and could unjustifiably delay the conclusion of the conference. Difficulties of an objective nature also exist. Documents are being prepared in Vienna today in a new atmosphere, at a stage in which East-West relations are beginning to take shape under the auspices of a new political thinking. Both at this conference and outside of it this is taking place under the difficult conditions of overcoming prejudices and cliches inherited from the past.

Petur Mladenov declared that he had been entrusted to express once again the readiness of the states represented at the Sofia meeting of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee to contribute comprehensively to the drafting of a meaningful and balanced final document.

He dwelled on the tasks of the Vienna meeting: adoption of the 10 principles of the Final Act in their unity and entirety, resumption of the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe, preparation of qualitatively new measures that could be extended to the Mediterranean, and the beginning of negotiations on conventional disarmament. The subject of these negotiations, armed forces and conventional weapons, should not exclude the dual capable means. The existing lack of symmetry and the lack of balance on an all-European scale, as well as in individual regions should be eliminated on a mutual basis.

Petur Mladenov stressed that, in order to make these negotiations truly successful, it is particularly important to determine the zone they encompass, whose boundaries are directly dependent on all participating states having equal rights and obligations and on the principle of equal security. It is of primary importance that the zone of negotiations should encompass the territory and the forces of all participating states, also those in the southern part of the continent.

Petur Mladenov finally informed the participants about the proposal to close the Vienna meeting at the level of foreign ministers. This would provide an opportunity for an exchange of opinions on further intensifying the all-European process. It would mark the beginning of negotiations at the forums related to confidence-building measures and to the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

**Bulgarian, Czechoslovak CSCE Delegates Speak**  
*AU192058 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak*  
16 Apr 88 pp 1, 5

[Report by Bratislava PRAVDA staff journalist Jozef Janto from Vienna: "The Sixth Round of the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting Has Begun; Obstructions by Western Delegations"]

[Text] The sixth round of the CSCE follow-up meeting began in Vienna on Friday [15 April]. Petur Mladenov, minister of foreign affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, and heads of seven delegations, including the Czechoslovak delegation, spoke on the opening day.

Petur Mladenov briefed the representatives of the 35 states participating in the Vienna follow-up meeting on the results of the recent session of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states. He stressed that the most important result of the Sofia session is the willingness

to facilitate through concrete actions the process of real disarmament, to prevent its arrest, and thus allow it to continue to develop and become irreversible.

Several heads of delegations received this appeal positively, especially the passage containing the proposal to begin separate talks on the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including nuclear components for dual-purpose systems, on the subsequent elimination of these weapons, on the need to work out a convention this very year on banning chemical weapons and eliminating the stockpiles of them, on the establishment of nuclear-and chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe, and so forth. They also appreciated the fact that the Soviet Union has already withdrawn its missiles from CSSR and GDR territory, even prior to the ratification of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. They called for an early ratification of this treaty, especially by the U.S. Congress.

However, yesterday's speeches by some heads of Western delegations were not in the spirit of a creative search for possibilities of arriving at the elaboration of the Vienna follow-up meeting's final document in the course of this round. The speech by Warren Zimmermann, head of the American delegation, and, in particular, by D. Mellor, minister of state in the Ministry of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of Great Britain, who took part in the opening of the sixth round yesterday, definitely did not contribute to the creation of a favorable atmosphere. D. Mellor grossly attacked the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and some other socialist states for the alleged failure to observe human rights. Regarding Czechoslovakia, he tried to depict the issue of religious freedoms in a one-sided and distorted manner.

In his speech Ambassador Frantisek Dolezal, head of the Czechoslovak delegation, reacted to these attacks, among other things. He stressed that although religious freedoms in the CSSR are guaranteed by the Constitution, of late we have witnessed efforts to organize opposition groups and incite them to activity designed to cause unrest in our society. The activity that took place in Bratislava on 25 March belongs in this category, its purpose being to negatively influence the atmosphere of the talks between the Czechoslovak state and the Vatican.

We are astonished, F. Dolezal continued, that in Britain—where human rights are being violated on such a mass scale and where they even shoot people on the street (for example, the shooting of three defenseless pedestrians in Gibraltar by the British police), and where the police brutally disperse advocates of peace protesting against the further, feverish arms buildup—there is such deep concern about what happened in Bratislava.

One positive thing that we can point out—and this, too, was stressed by Ambassador F. Dolezal—is the fact that the socialist states approach the Helsinki process comprehensively, that they sincerely strive for the Vienna

meeting to be concluded to the satisfaction of all participating countries, in the interest of all nations trying to build a "European home." This is also attested to by the Czechoslovak initiative, aimed at establishing a zone of trust and cooperation and good-neighborly relations along the line of contact between the two military-political blocs, which received full support at the session of the committee of ministers in Sofia. At the Vienna meeting, too, we have noted positive interest in this initiative, which is being further worked out taking into consideration the interest of our partners.

### Update on Missile Inspection Agreements

#### Assembly Approves Missile Inspection Agreements

LD191507 Prague CTK in English  
1420 GMT 19 Apr 88

[Text] Prague April 19 (CTK)—The Czechoslovak Federal Assembly today approved three documents of international character and significance.

The deputies approved an agreement between Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic linked to the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the liquidation of their intermediate- and shorter-range missiles signed last year. At the same time they approved an agreement resulting from the exchange of notes between Czechoslovakia and the United States on inspections on Czechoslovak territory on December 18, 1987 and January 4, 1988.

Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek, who presented the government proposal for approval of the two documents, stressed that it is for the first time in history that the deputies of Czechoslovakia's supreme legislative assembly discuss documents of this kind. He recalled that representatives of the Czechoslovak Assembly participated in the debate about the U.S.-Soviet treaty in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

The Soviet Union with its innovating approach, new view of the present antagonistic but at the same time mutually linked world, contributed in a decisive way to the signing of the Soviet-U.S. treaty in Washington last year, Bohuslav Chnoupek said emphasizing that the treaty is the first concrete result of the new political thinking in the sphere of disarmament. The two documents approved by the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly today confirm the peace orientation of the country's foreign policy, its concrete contribution to the process of strengthening the positive tendencies in the present international relations, Bohuslav Chnoupek said and added that the documents will come into effect simultaneously with the implementation of the Soviet-U.S. treaty.

At the close of its session today the Federal Assembly expressed consent with the convention against torture, signed by Czechoslovakia at the United Nations headquarters in September 1986.

House of the People rapporteur Frantisek Vymetal, general vicar of the Olomouc Archdiocese and dean of the Cyril and Methodius Theological Faculty at Litomerice, said that Czechoslovakia "contributes to the struggle against flagrant and serious human rights violations about which the Czechoslovak public learn especially from countries where fascist and racist regimes still survive. He voiced the conviction that the document will become an important instrument in strengthening general respect for human rights and man's health and dignity.

Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek said in an exposé that tortures and inhuman treatment still occur despite the U.N. effort and these inhuman practices have reached monstrous dimensions especially in South Africa. Israeli authorities also do not hesitate to use violence and degrading treatment especially against persons protesting against the aggressive policy of Israel and its acts of international terrorism. Systematic torture of anti-fascists in Chile and the licence of the authorities in Northern Ireland are but some of the examples, the minister said.

Czechoslovakia is a party to all major international agreements on human rights. Last year it ratified the international convention against apartheid in sport and the international convention against the taking of hostages. By endorsing the document against torture Czechoslovakia expresses consistent support for the respect of human rights and basic freedoms as well as the resolve to constructively cooperate in this field, the foreign minister said.

#### Chnoupek Discusses Agreements

LD192033 Prague Domestic Service in Czech  
1630 GMT 19 Apr 88

[Text] Milos Jakes, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, Gustav Husak, president of the Republic, and Lubomir Strougal, federal premier, today attended a joint meeting of the Chamber of the People and the Chamber of Nations. [passage omitted]

The deputies discussed and approved two agreements: A tripartite agreement between Czechoslovakia, the USSR, and GDR on inspections that is linked to the agreement between the USSR and the United States on eliminating intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, and on the agreement between Czechoslovakia and the United States on inspecting Soviet military establishments on our territory.

Foreign minister Bohuslav Chnoupek said this about the agreements:

[Begin Chnoupek recording] The two proposed documents represent a specific example of implementing the foreign political guideline of the 17th CPCZ Congress. They represent an active part by our country in the joint effort of the socialist states for a world without nuclear weapons and without violence. Each of the two documents is independent, although they are closely connected with one another. They will become valid concurrently with the Soviet-U.S.

treaty. They will be applied during the implementation of inspections on our territory, in harmony with the Washington treaty and the protocol from it. I should like to stress that the inspections on our territory, just as on the territory of eight European countries, constitute a part of absolutely unprecedented, until recently inconcievable, verification measures, which are stipulated by the Washington treaty. The appeal of the times, however, asks for new nonstandard procedures and measures. Inspections represent one of these such measures. [end recording] [passage omitted]

### CSSR-GDR Proposal to FRG on CW-Free Zone Talks Reported

LD192011 Prague CTK in English  
1932 GMT 19 Apr 88

[Text] Bonn April 19 (CTK correspondent)—A proposal of the Czechoslovak and GDR Governments for holding talks on the liquidation of chemical weapons from the territory of Czechoslovakia, the GDR and the FRG, or on the preservation of these territories free of chemical arms, was submitted here Tuesday.

The proposal was handed over by Czechoslovak Ambassador to West Germany Dusan Spacil and head of the GDR Permanent Mission to Bonn Ewald Moldt to FRG Government envoy for disarmament and arms control Josef Holik.

The Czechoslovak and GDR ambassadors stressed that the negotiations should include parts of an agreement on a worldwide ban on chemical weapons, mainly the passages concerning control, which have been adopted already during the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. Czechoslovakia and the GDR regard their proposal as a concrete offer to overcome difficulties in elaborating a general convention of a ban on chemical weapons.

### GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

#### NEUES DEUTSCHLAND Hits NATO Policy on Conventional Disarmament

LD131442 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0737 GMT 13 Apr 88

[Text] Berlin, 13 Apr (ADN)—The relative strengths of conventional forces in Europe and the readiness of NATO to disarm in this area is examined by NEUES DEUTSCHLAND Wednesday in an article with the headline: "For a Low Level of Armament in All Areas." The paper writes that one takes notice "when a number of forces in NATO describe the 'overcoming of imbalances in the conventional area' as a precondition for practically all further disarmament steps in Europe."

"The states of the Warsaw Pact do not think much of the construction of such preconditions and artificial dependencies." The article says the Pact countries favor disarmament in all weapons categories and reiterates the socialist countries' proposals already on the table:

—the Budapest appeal, which proposes a step-by-step reduction of forces in Europe by more than 1 million men, to which a constructive response by NATO is still missing;

—the officially expressed readiness to remove existing imbalances on the principle that he who has more must disarm more, naturally on a mutual basis;

—the recent proposal to exchange, in the near future, information on Warsaw Pact and NATO forces and conventional arms in Europe, which until now has been received on the Western side in a surprisingly reticent way.

It is seen as welcome "that the areas of agreement between the 23 member states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO are increasing in the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna on a mandate for negotiations on conventional disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals."

"But another tendency, which has also been noticed in the past, cannot be overlooked: The more visible the striving toward the long expected commencement of negotiations on conventional disarmament becomes, the more plainly do its opponents appear on the scene." And further: "Can certain Western circles be circulating conceptions in which reductions in the ratio of, would you believe, 1:40 to the detriment of the Warsaw Pact are being aimed for as a result of the negotiations? To 'justify' these demands, the distorted picture of a supposedly overwhelming conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact compared with NATO is painted."

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND notes that "the objective estimation of the balance of forces between the Warsaw Pact and NATO is indisputably an extremely important issue, and forms the starting point for the desired negotiations on conventional disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals."

According to the estimation of USSR Defense Minister Yazov, both military alliances have about the same manpower at their disposal and the same number of artillery pieces. The Warsaw Pact has superiority in tanks, and NATO has a numerical superiority in battle-ready troop units and fighter bombers.

"The fact must also be taken into account that the Warsaw Pact may have superiority in central Europe but NATO has it on the flanks," NEUES DEUTSCHLAND writes. Despite the differences in the forces of the alliances, "one comes, after an unprejudiced examination, to conclusions similar to those of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, namely that neither side has the capacity for a successful attack. It is, therefore, indeed high time that level-headedness, a sense of proportion, and an awareness of responsibility gain the upper hand with the leading [word indistinct] in NATO."

"Serious Western analysts and military experts have pointed on countless occasions to inconsistencies in the way NATO calculates figures. Usually, for example, the forces of France and Spain, around one million troops, are not taken into account. Or the national units, which are not subordinated to NATO, and the armaments potential stored in depots, are 'forgotten'." Nor is the clear superiority of the NATO naval forces usually mentioned.

"The distortions in the NATO position will quickly become clear when the exchange of data proposed by the Warsaw Pact is realized and the negotiations on conventional disarmament reach a serious phase. But the danger must not be overlooked that the clearly imbalanced representation of the relative strengths, as put forward by several leading NATO representatives, can prejudice the atmosphere at the negotiations," the paper writes. "It would be desirable for this to be realized as quickly as possible by all concerned in the interest of constructive negotiations."

#### Commentary Urges Data Comparison at MBFR Talks

DW191330 East Berlin *Voice of the GDR Domestic Service in German* 1520 GMT 18 Apr 88

[Guenter Leuschner commentary]

[Excerpts] It is not only experts who have unpleasant memories of the disastrous effects of the so-called data discussion at the Vienna talks on force reduction in central Europe. What is meant by data discussion is the quarrel over the numbers both sides produced on the current strength of their troops. Whether or not the differences of opinion were real, or whether they were but a welcome pretext for one of the negotiating sides is an open question. In any case, it was an issue that through many years prevented any successful outcome of the negotiations. It is obvious that we may not allow the same problem to arise again in the talks on Europe-wide troops and arms reductions. The danger of that obstacle coming up has again abated somewhat, owing to the shift in priorities we have seen in the meantime. What has become more important than the present weapons stocks of either East or West is the potential both sides will be allowed to keep as a result of the negotiations. The existence of so-called asymmetries in various military fields is no longer denied and the principle that more weapons should mean more disarmament for either side is now being met with mutual acceptance.

Despite all that there is no way to escape an objective comparison of forces and the exchange of facts and figures it requires. And that is where the Warsaw Pact countries would like to see a less time-consuming procedure.

We urge that all facts and figures for a comparison of forces be supplied at the very beginning of the talks and we have good reason to do so. The advantage of supplying official data in advance is that it could no longer be altered in the course of the negotiations. Such a procedure would render discussions more objective and would force the West to do without the highly unrealistic numbers that are, if anything, used to mislead the public.

A second advantage would be the chance for experts to compare their own estimates with the other side's data and even settle whatever problems may arise before negotiations actually start. We could thus spot existing asymmetries early and deal with the problem of their removal from the very outset of the negotiations. It would, in other words, be an enormous gain in time.

As the Vienna conference is behind schedule and possibly aggravates setting a date for a European disarmament conference, we might thus be in a position to compensate for some of the time that has been lost. The idea seems to be so reasonable that the NATO countries ought to be equally interested in a faster data exchange.

It is all the more surprising, therefore, that our appeal has gone unanswered. The idea was not exactly met with a great deal of enthusiasm on the part of the Americans, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said after his meeting with Shultz. In Vienna, too, the West has so far failed to come forward with any response to our proposal. We are wondering what may be the reason for them to act so hesitatingly.

#### GDR, CSSR Envoys' CW Arms Ban Proposal to FRG

LD192019 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1724 GMT 19 Apr 88

[Text] Bonn, 19 Apr (ADN)—On behalf of their governments, Ewald Moldt, head of the GDR's permanent mission to the FRG, and the CSSR ambassador to the FRG submitted a proposal to the FRG Government today at the start of official negotiations on freeing, or keeping free, the territories of the three states of chemical weapons. They explained the development of the offer of negotiation presented in May 1986, which was linked with this step, to Ambassador Dr Josef Holik, the Federal Government representative for questions of disarmament and arms control.

The GDR and CSSR representatives stressed that it would be a timely move to apply the treaty elements adopted at the Geneva disarmament conference for a global elimination of chemical weapons, including above all for control, in central Europe in advance.

In view of the present impasse in the work of the Geneva disarmament conference, a step of this nature could help overcome difficulties and bring closer a global ban, to which the FRG Government is also committed. This is, at the same time, a specific offer by the GDR and the

CSSR to the FRG to work together so as not to allow a break in the disarmament process. Ambassador Holik agreed to pass on the proposal to the FRG Government.

**GDR, CSSR Propose Talks on CW-Free Zone to FRG**

*LD192019a East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1724 GMT 19 Apr 88*

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**Honecker, FRG's Vogel Hold 'Constructive' Talk**

**Officials Meet in Berlin**

*LD211254 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1126 GMT 21 Apr 88*

[Text] Berlin, 21 Apr (ADN)—Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, had a talk with the prime minister of the FRG Federal State of Rhineland-Palatinate, Dr Bernhard Vogel, the current president of the FRG Bundesrat, at the official seat of the GDR State Council in Berlin on Thursday.

At the start of the exchange of views Dr Bernhard Vogel conveyed greetings from Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his colleagues in the Bundesrat, the prime ministers of the federal states. Erich Honecker reciprocated the greetings. In this connection Dr Bernhard Vogel stressed that the FRG, as expressed in the statements by Helmut Kohl, is determined to continue to advance along the path agreed in the joint communique of 7 September 1987. [East Berlin ADN International

Service in German at 1422 GMT on 21 April transmits a correction to the date in the preceding sentence as follows: ...joint communique of 8 September 1987.]

Erich Honecker began by mentioning his meeting with Dr Bernhard Vogel in Trier during his official visit to the FRG on 10 September 1987. The two politicians said that since then there has been a series of positive changes both in the international situation and in bilateral relations. They praised the conclusion of the treaty between the USSR and the United States on the elimination of their intermediate-range missiles and stressed the need for a speedy ratification of that treaty. Erich Honecker referred to the advance concession made by the USSR, the GDR, and the CSSR with the early withdrawal and subsequent liquidation of Soviet intermediate-range missiles. The two sides agreed that there must not be any pause in the process of disarmament. Erich Honecker recalled the proposals of the GDR, CSSR, and the Polish People's Republic for the creation of zones free of battlefield nuclear weapons and chemical weapons as well as proposals for establishing a nonaggression capability for the armed forces both of the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

Disclosures about the two sides' armed forces and personnel strengths would be of great importance here. Dr Bernhard Vogel made it clear that these issues are very important in the overall complex of continuing disarmament in the nuclear and conventional sphere and with regard to banning chemical weapons of mass destruction.

Erich Honecker and Dr Bernhard Vogel agreed that relations between the two German states must remain a stabilizing factor for constructive East-West relations. Erich Honecker stressed that the GDR, proceeding from the results of his official visit to the FRG in September 1987, will continue its policy, aimed at peace preservation and businesslike cooperation, toward the FRG.

The two politicians exchanged views on interstate relations, paying special attention to relations between the GDR and the Federal State of Rhineland-Palatinate and agreeing to continue to expand them.

The talk took place in a businesslike and constructive atmosphere. It was attended by: Secretary of State Frank-Joachim Herrmann, head of the chancellery of the State Council chairman; and Hans Schindler, acting head of the FRG department in the GDR Foreign Ministry. Also present were the head of the FRG's permanent mission in the GDR, Dr Hans Otto Braeutigam, and Secretary of State Hanns-Eberhard Schleyer, head of the State Chancellery of the Federal State of Rhineland-Palatinate.

**Vogel: Talks 'Open, Fair'**  
*LD211846 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1334 GMT 21 Apr 88*

[Text] Berlin, 21 Apr (ADN)—Dr Bernhard Vogel, the prime minister of Rhineland-Palatinate and current president of the FRG Bundesrat, described his 1 and 1/2

hour talk with Erich Honecker on Thursday as open and fair. Speaking to the international press after this third meeting with Honecker, he stressed the latter's optimistic assessment of the situation. This applies both internationally and bilaterally as far as relations between the GDR and the Federal Republic are concerned, as well as to the situation in the GDR. It was stated with satisfaction that, happily, the agreement on the elimination of the intermediate-range missiles was brought about after the meetings last year, in February in the GDR and in Trier in September. He said that further progress in other arms control spheres must follow and that a far-reaching improvement in relations must not remain restricted to the military sphere.

It is particularly important for agreements and arms control to be reached in the conventional sphere. Erich Honecker spoke of his desire to see a reduction in asymmetries. The aim must be a nonaggression capacity in the two alliance systems. Bernhard Vogel said that this is in line with a worldwide elimination of chemical weapons as well as controlling them. Erich Honecker regards the stipulations of relevant zones as suitable steps toward this overall goal, said Bernhard Vogel, while he himself is optimistic enough to hope that a worldwide agreement can be reached in the foreseeable future.

The two politicians addressed in detail the situations in the two countries. Proceeding from the preparations for the CDU federal congress in Wiesbaden in June, Bernhard Vogel stressed that the basic positions of the CDU remain unchanged. Its aim is, despite the existence of differences in basic positions, to do what is possible. The year 1987 has brought us progress in relations between the GDR and the Federal Republic, the politician said.

He singled out Erich Honecker's visit to the FRG, the increase in tourist traffic, the agreement on the supply of electricity as well as three other agreements. It is the FRG's desire that this path be continued. Vogel added: The State Council chairman was, happily, able to confirm that the development of tourist traffic is also positive in the first quarter of 1988, that there are no reductions but increases. He specifically described the rumors about planned limits on the reunification of families as fairy tales and confirmed that the GDR, too, wants to continue the path embarked on in relations between the Federal Republic and the GDR.

As far as developing economic relations is concerned, there is no reason for pessimism either. It could be said that economic relations with Rhineland-Palatinate have developed in an above average fashion. While deliveries from the FRG to the GDR have increased by 33 percent between 1981 and 1987, those from the federal state have increased 71 percent. The same applies to deliveries from the GDR to Rhineland-Palatinate.

Bernhard Vogel expressed satisfaction about the state reached in the town-twinning agreements and stressed those between Mainz and Erfurt, Ludwigshafen and Dessau, and Trier and Weimar. The task is now—it has been noted in agreement—to safeguard the success of the partnerships.

At the end of his remarks to the press at the FRG's Permanent Mission in the GDR, Bernhard Vogel stressed that the "European home" was also mentioned in the talk with Erich Honecker. In this, they agreed that the more confined conflicts become, the more German they become. It must be our overriding concern to do everything—also in our relations with our respective allies—to jointly bring about solutions to conflicts and to prevent conflicts between the two alliance systems and to ensure that we have a particularly responsible task in this.

## POLAND

### PPR's Jaroszek Addresses Geneva Disarmament Conference

LD150901 Warsaw PAP in English  
2043 GMT 14 Apr 88

[By PAP correspondent Edward Dylawerski]

[Text] Geneva, April 14—Poland's Foreign Vice-Minister Henryk Jaroszek presented Poland's stand on the most important disarmament questions and discussed key aspects of Poland's activity to consolidate peace and international security at today's plenary session of the Disarmament Conference of 40 states held here.

Jaroszek stressed a decisive role of the breakthrough that took place in the Soviet-U.S. dialogue and the fact that the USSR and the U.S. consider the Washington treaty only as a first step in efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals.

Stressing the activity of Poland, the USSR and other socialist states to promote real progress in disarmament negotiations, including the Geneva conference forum, Jaroszek, now general secretary of the political consultative committee of the states-parties to the Warsaw Treaty, recalled a number of initiatives contained in the documents of conferences of this body adopted in Budapest and Berlin and sessions of the foreign ministers' committee in Prague and Sofia.

The speaker laid special emphasis on the work on a convention banning chemical weapons and pointed to new possibilities to speedily complete it, created by constructive proposals of the states-parties to the Warsaw Treaty, primarily as regards verification.

The conference's priorities, the speaker stressed, should still include the questions of nuclear disarmament, total ban on nuclear weapons tests as well as the prevention of arms race in outer space.

Jaroszek presented some aspects of materialization of the Jaruzelski Plan and said that the main ideas of the plan met with many positive opinions.

The exchange of views initiated by the presentation of the plan turned out to be helpful in seeking a common

stand by the Warsaw Treaty and NATO states on such questions as the revision of war doctrines towards giving them an exclusively defensive character and on other aspects of disarmament.

The plan does not propose ready solutions and, pointing to possible options, supports common international efforts aimed to implement the ideas contained in it.

**Academic Roundtable on Meaning of 'Reasonable Sufficiency'**

52001059 Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE in English No 12, Dec 87 pp 2-9

[Discussion recorded by V. Bogdanov and G. Lokshin]

[Text] The Public Commission on Disarmament Problems of the Soviet Peace Committee has been actively working for many years. Recently its participants held a discussion dedicated to the concept, "reasonable sufficiency," propounded by the 27th CPSU Congress.

Taking part in the exchange of views were: L. Semeiko, D. Sc. [History], from Institute of U.S.A. and Canada Studies; S. Fedorenko, Cand. Sc. [History], from Institute of U.S.A. and Canada Studies; A. Yefremov, D. Sc. [History], from Institute of the International Working-Class Movement; Admiral [Ret.] A. Astafyev from Institute of the World Economy and International Relations; A. Nikonov, D. Sc. [History], from Institute of the World Economy and International Relations; Yu. Streletsov, Cand. Sc. [Geography], from Institute of the World Economy and International Relations; A. Kireyev, Cand. Sc. [History], from Moscow State Institute of International Relations; G. Sturua, Cand. Sc. [History], from Institute of World Economy and International Relations, and V. Zhurkin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences from Institute of U.S.A. and Canada Studies.

Below is an abridged record of the discussion.

L. Semeiko. The "reasonable sufficiency" problem, apart from what had been said about it at the Congress, was practically not discussed by our mass media. As a result, the problem is interpreted in so many ways.

Many think that it's the equivalent of the balance concept. If this is the case, there's no need inventing another term. I think this is a new and very important Soviet concept. It is military-doctrinal and political, since it is included in the principles of a universal system of international security, the military section of which has an item about reasonable sufficiency and the concept of building up armed forces, and answers the question: "What is sufficient for defence?"

I would suggest such definition (although, definitions have always been disputable): reasonable sufficiency of military potentials in their level and character of military activity which secure the solution of military tasks and prevention of war by lowest possible forces and means with the approximate military balance preserved.

Such stability may have several criteria, the first one is to have such military potential which would not evoke worries in other states about their security, or figuratively speaking, must not be of a threatening character. The second criterion concerns the opponent as well: we,

too, would feel free of an impending threat. Consequently, the other side must also have a corresponding level. And the third principle: reasonable sufficiency of military potential provides reliable defence of our state interests. Thus, if the first two criteria speak about what we must have "lower," the third one shows what we must have in order to defend our state interests.

I'm against "reasonable sufficiency of nuclear potential" because there is nothing reasonable in it. The possibility of multiple destruction of the other side must not be considered reasonable, even its single destruction is unreasonable.

Now about conventional weapons. Neither NATO nor our forces be considered reasonably sufficient at the moment. Why? Because they contradict the above criteria. The military power of each side causes the other side worry since a sudden attack is possible. And that is the reason for the present consultations between the Warsaw Treaty countries and NATO in Vienna, in particular, about how armed forces and armaments in Europe must be reduced to exclude the possibility of a sudden attack.

The following example illustrates the necessity of maintaining the balance within the framework of reasonable sufficiency: one side has, say, 100 pieces of weapons, while the other—90, and maybe even 80, because less armaments are needed for defence than for offence, in principle. Still Clausewitz wrote that the offensive side must have three times the forces of the defensive. Therefore, if we want to have true reasonable sufficiency of our armed forces it can be even less than that of a potential enemy (in absolute figures).

Reasonable sufficiency is, of course, not only a numerical strength, and it would be wrong to have in mind only the number of tanks, airplanes, etc. The structure of the armed forces must also be taken into account.

In this case, the forms of realization of reasonable sufficiency will occupy first place. I'll give some possible variants.

1. Removal of one-sided preferences. Generally speaking, we are doing this now by giving up medium-range missiles in Europe, though we have more warheads on these missiles than Americans. And we are making still greater concessions in shorter-range missiles, i.e., with the missiles of less than a thousand km. The fact that we are unilaterally giving them up is a step for the realization of the reasonable sufficiency concept.

2. Unilateral reduction of conventional armed forces. A classical example: 20,000 men and 1,000 tanks were withdrawn from the GDR in 1980.

3. Asymmetrical response to enemy's actions. For example: SDI and our possible counter-measures. Or: the enemy has developed a thousand tanks. Within the framework of reasonable sufficiency, it is unnecessary

for us also to develop a thousand tanks. We can develop a thousand anti-tank means. This is also an asymmetrical response. The matter is, in the strategic sphere it is impossible to make an adequate response to the increase of offensive weapons by defensive ones while in the conventional sphere it is possible, in general.

It may sound paradoxical, but stepping up combat capabilities is a form of defence. The limits of sufficiency is dictated not by us but by U.S. and NATO actions.

4. A complex moment—liquidation of troops intended for conducting deep offensive operations. It would be possible, within the framework of reasonable sufficiency, if not to liquidate then to reduce first of all tank forces, bomber aviation, airborne troops, marines.

Such actions, even unilateral, would demonstrate that the given side adheres to a defensive military doctrine. I repeat, what is important is not only the amount of armed forces and their defensive character, but also the form of military activity.

The defensive character of military doctrine can be seen from such steps as the obligation not to use nuclear weapons first, reduction of the scope of military exercises, reduction of the scope of offensive operations in these exercises, reduction of concentration of troops in the most accessible directions, and withdrawal of the most dangerous offensive weapons from a zone of contact of blocks.

In principle, if reasonable sufficiency is realized, we would have the situation we had during the Great Patriotic War at the Karelian front. A stable entrenched front from Onega Lake to Murmansk did not have offensive capabilities and stood firm till October 1944 when Finland capitulated. Or the confrontation in the Far East when neither we nor the Japanese had the opportunity to cross the border and launch an offensive. That was why military operations did not take place there till 1945.

So, ideally, reasonable sufficiency has three components: absence of mass destruction weapons, limitation of military potentials (quantitatively and qualitatively) by limits enough for equal security, and changing the character of military activity of armed forces which, in turn, would confirm the defensive nature of the military doctrine.

S. Fedorenko. Lev Semyonovich, you've said that our and enemy combat capabilities must be equal to each other. But why? Maybe this is a prescription for an endless buildup of our combat capabilities if the other side continues to build up a potential of the same scope? I think that combat capabilities or potential is a function of requirements, but our requirements differ greatly from those of the enemy.

The United States, for example, set itself a goal to establish control over three or four oceans and to have 600 combat vessels in its Navy. Is it necessary to repeat the U.S. example and have 600 vessels for us? Our Navy has a little over 600 surface vessels but their total tonnage is less. Is it expedient for us to do the same or have we our own interests in our defence policy?

L. Semeiko. In principle, if the enemy continues to build up its military power in the 90s on sea, in the air or on the ground, then we, following our reasonable sufficiency concept, must also build it up to make our defence strong, but it is important not to create the so-called "super concept" as we did before. There will be a reaction, but it must be reasonable.

S. Fedorenko. I'll put a more simple question, but it will perhaps provide an answer for all of us: What is the purpose of the reasonable sufficiency concept and what is its main sense for us?

L. Semeiko. I think, not an economic one. The main sense is to preserve peace in this way—and this is a new way which leads to the restructuring of our military-political thinking.

A. Yefremov. That means the idea is to get rid of excesses and to have only what is necessary? To optimize our military potential according to our requirements or, as I understand it, to reduce to a minimum our efforts in defence?

A. Astafyev. Let's clear it up. The other side has more striking means and it does not want to reduce them. This is the reality. The present confrontation, as you know, is the counteraction of two wills—ours and theirs. Unilateral concessions and unilateral compromises are conducted not for the sake of the compromises as such but for obtaining some concrete goal.

And if the other side does nothing in response? Development of their armed forces, and everything which is being done in control systems, development of weapons and everything we see confirms that they are conducting qualitative modernization, building up their combat power, effectiveness, offensiveness and the like. The factor of the other side, I think, must also be taken into consideration.

L. Semeiko. One of the criteria of our concept is clearly defined: to have enough forces to feel ourselves confident.

A. Nikonorov. Is it enough? This is the main question. For obtaining security, our interests or something else?

It seems to me that the reasonable sufficiency concept is not only a military but a foreign policy concept as well. If one side has global and chauvinistic goals, that means the level of its reasonable sufficiency will be rather great. If we set ourselves some other foreign-policy goals, then,

naturally, the level of our defence must be corrected, too. Here, of course, our economic capabilities and, mainly, the priorities of our society, as compared with Americans, play an essential role. We must build our reasonable sufficiency proceeding from this.

This theme becomes more important with each day in military-political, military-economic researches and practical policy. Of course, we have a great deal of problems now. For example, is this concept for the whole world or only for us? I think it is for the world as well as for us. Hence, naturally, goals are different. Why? If for the whole world, it must be mutually acceptable. If these are unilateral proposals, it will be simply air bang, without any resonance from the other side.

Yu. Streltsov. I think, we must consider reasonable sufficiency both as a really existing model and as an ideal one. I'll begin, for the sake of simplicity, from an ideal model. In what way must disarmament be performed and how should reasonable sufficiency be achieved so that no one could make an attack? Ideally, we propose something in this way. But neither the present situation nor the experience of the past give us hope that such an ideal will correspond to the level of reasonable sufficiency for defence. We can hardly come up to this in the near future. That means we must speak about sufficiency which can be really achieved. So, first—what can we do by using the reasonable sufficiency criterion even if the other side does not want this?

We understand that, primarily perhaps due to the parity, which remains and which is sufficiently comprehensive and stable in its changes, we can have security by lesser means. Otherwise, naturally, we would not suggest such variants which we are proposing now, because this will be detrimental to our own security and the security of our allies. The goal is to throw off "excessive fat." This can be compared with a sportsman who built up excessive weight: he should go to the bath-house, beat himself with birch twigs and throw off the excessive weight. After that he will be quicker, have a better reaction, etc. But, in general, we think not about this. We think that the other side must also be filled with the basic knowledge of a new political thinking and new approaches, and accept the concepts we had worked out together. We do not want to play the role of a higher authority.

This gives us the idea that, first, the reasonable sufficiency concept must be mutual. Unilateral understanding of the reasonable sufficiency criterion will lead us nowhere.

And, second, following from this—there exist different levels of reasonable sufficiency: both under the conditions of existing nuclear weapons (one cannot disregard this now—till the West adheres to this, we must search for a common ground to cooperate) and under the conditions of a nuclear-free world. That's why I think that in the long-term struggle for the realization of the

principles of new thinking and the reasonable sufficiency concept, there are also reasonable limits of sufficiency, and during nuclear disarmaments, with nuclear weapons preserved.

S. Fedorenko. It seems to me that the question of defining the purpose of reasonable sufficiency is the right one. And it must be solved at a political level, because having not defined the categories of political and national interests, and security interests, it is useless, to my mind, to talk about what is sufficient to reasonably secure them.

I support Streltsov's opinion: reasonable sufficiency must be both unilateral and multilateral. It will be ineffective if we fail to involve in it our partners and opponents. If we want it to have sense, it is necessary to have an understanding not only of what reasonable sufficiency means but also of what situation we want to achieve in military-political relations with our enemy. For this, we must have at least a common language which is not available today. Everybody speaks about many categories and about such things as stability, non-provocative defence, first strike, etc., but all understand them differently.

And another thing, I do not consider that we must define non-provocative defence with abusive words. This idea represents a great interest and finds support in this country as well. For example, there was the idea of writing a common book "Generals for Peace: the West and the East," in which the ideas of non-provocative defence would be actively and very positively discussed.

A. Kireyev. The goal of our concept is the universal and complete reduction of armaments and armed forces, and maximal limitation of military actions. I would like to emphasize that we are for transforming this concept into policy, into international policy of all states and peoples so that it can embrace all states and the whole globe. Of course, the choice of ways of realizing such a policy is very complicated and it, apparently, will happen only during a period of smooth relations between two groupings of states, even between three, if we take into consideration nonaligned neutral countries. It is clear, perhaps, that this concept must be realized in the shortest period of time. Apparently, an international negotiating mechanism must be formed specially for this theme, without stopping other important negotiations on the control of armaments and disarmament now being carried out. Finally, when the situation permits, the USSR and U.S. leaders have to make high authoritative statements, or an international declaration should be adopted for transforming into action this concept which has become a policy.

G. Sturua. Political interests must be defined and this is the key to the problem. Is this a mutual concept? only for the Soviet Union or for the West as well? Of course, this is a mutual concept. Why? Naturally, we have undertaken all these measures not only to decrease the means

for defence but also to compel the opponent to reduce its own military potential and lower the level of military confrontation. If we fail to do this, we won't be able to realize our unilateral reasonable sufficiency concept. What have I in mind? Suppose that we reduce the number of tanks and servicemen in Europe. If, in the long run, this action not only fails to produce a positive effect, but on the contrary, provokes still more aggressiveness, then it is clear that, in fact, we have not done anything new to ensure our own security. From the point of view of logic, technology and computer calculations, we need less, but from the point of view of the opposite side, which wants to preserve this, that has brought about the opposite result. The perception of our actions by the enemy must also be introduced into the reasonable sufficiency concept as a certain integral element. In this sense, our actions may seem reasonable in terms of a formal, computer solution, but they may be fatal from the point of view of a political solution. We must not make attempts to determine what is reasonable sufficiency, apart from a general phrase that reasonable sufficiency is the minimal effort for ensuring our security. Life itself will give the final determination of reasonable sufficiency. It will be in a constant change. If we make attempts to drive the problem into rigid forms, we will put ourselves in a difficult position, and I think that political leadership will simply reject these rigid bulky formulations. They will fetter manoeuvrability and flexibility, and will, in fact, be politically unacceptable.

V. Zhurkin. The formation of the concept of reasonable sufficiency and the introduction of that concept into the political life, the interweaving it into the fabric of international relations represents a process, and perhaps a prolonged one. It can and will develop only as a component of the proliferation of the ideas of the new type of thinking and as a component of the penetration of those ideas into the state's foreign-policy activity.

Therefore, the reasonable sufficiency seems to me to be a two-side (or even a multiside) concept, and at the same time a one-side concept. Each state must revise its military potential and determine the excesses of armaments which can be subject to reduction which will not shutter the state's security (and there are more than enough of such redundant reserves in the present-day arsenals brimming full of armaments).

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**Economic Impulse—Factor in Disarmament**  
52001051 Moscow EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA in  
Russian No 1, Jan 88

[Article by Dr of Economic Sciences R. Faramazyan, sector chief at the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, under "Global Problems of the Present Day" rubric: "Economics and Disarmament"; first paragraph is EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA introduction. Passages in boldface as published]

**[Text] The treaty on the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range missiles signed by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev, and President of the United States, R. Reagan, was an important step on the way to a nuclear-free world. This is the first real breakthrough toward disarmament, which showed in practice that one can go the way of destroying nuclear arsenals without harming anyone.**

The striving for a nuclear-free world is dictated by the interests of all of humanity: only in this way can it ensure its own survival. But in today's interdependent and interrelated world, disarmament is not only a military and political but also an economic imperative.

**Waste of Resources**

The arms race imposed by imperialism causes tremendous harm to the development of the economy. For decades it has been diverting colossal resources for unproductive purposes. According to the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, worldwide military expenditures in the years 1950-1987 amounted to about \$19 trillion (in constant prices). Seventy five million people and 20 percent of graduated scientists and engineers were employed in military preparations. From 5 to 10 percent of the basic forms of raw materials (these indicators are substantially higher for some forms of mineral raw materials) and 5 to 6 percent of the entire world consumption of petroleum are used for military purposes. **The expenditures for the arms race reached a level where they are already comparable with the material losses from past world wars.**

The special features of the military preparations of imperialism under contemporary conditions—their large scale, long term and global nature—contribute to the exacerbation of its old contradictions and to the appearance of new ones and to the worsening of social and economic difficulties. An analysis of the basic economic indicators of 17 developed capitalist countries carried out by American scientists shows that to a considerable extent the reduction of the competitiveness of American goods and the decline in the relative weight of the United States in the total volume of the gross national product, industrial production and exports of the capitalist world are explained by the high degree of militarization of the economy of the United States.

Among industrially developed Western countries, there is an inverse relationship between the share of gross national product allocated for the research and engineering-design developments for military purposes on the one hand and the competitiveness of their industry in the international market on the other. In the area of military research and development, the United States and Great Britain are ahead, followed by France, Sweden, the FRG, and Japan but this order is directly reversed when it is a matter of competitiveness.

Bourgeois scientists love to resort to the thesis that the arms race supposedly stimulates the development of the economy and accelerates scientific-technical progress. Special praise is given to the so-called "spin-off" effect, that is, to the utilization of the results of military research, developments and technologies in the civilian area. The "spin-off" phenomenon does indeed exist but the adherents of the arms race exaggerate its importance and scope out of selfish considerations.

The technology of military production is becoming more and more specific and it is more and more complicated to use it in civilian sectors. This relates, for example, to radar and systems for electronic detection, observation and reconnaissance. Even the military department of the United States considers that today 90 percent of all scientific research work ordered or financed by the Pentagon has no impact on civilian sectors of industry.

At the same time, the extensive use of the achievements of scientific-technical progress for military purposes has led to the fact that science is now militarized to a significantly greater degree than the economy as a whole.

Expenditures for military research and development make up, for example, more than two-thirds of the expenditures of the U.S. Federal Government for research and experimental design work and about one-third of all expenditures in the country for scientific-technical development. According to the estimates of experts, from 30 to 50 percent of all American scientists are employed in military research and development. A graphic example is the "star wars" program, for the development of which military centers in New Mexico, California and Texas attract the best technical forces, bleeding other sectors of industry.

The accelerated increase in expenditures for militaristic research is accompanied by a reduction of appropriations for work in civilian areas. This along with the mass diversion of scientists and engineers into the military sphere cannot help but curb scientific-technical progress as a whole.

The excessive militarization also results in an aggravation of foreign exchange and financial problems. The arms race leads to an increase in taxes, costs and unemployment and contributes to a worsening of the social and economic position of the working people of the capitalist countries.

#### In the Interests of Humanity

It is becoming more and more obvious that to strengthen the security of peoples and to accelerate social and economic progress it is necessary to put an end to the arms race.

"People want to live in peace," said M.S. Gorbachev in Washington, "where they do not have to spend millions of dollars every day for weapons that they can only use

against themselves." Disarmament would make it possible to allocate significant financial and material resources for development purposes.

Universal and complete disarmament, of course, would give the greatest result. But even the implementation of individual important measures in this direction will yield an indisputable economic effect. Many countries will have the possibility to alleviate the tax burden and to work out alternative variants of the utilization of the freed resources that would do most to contribute to the development of the economy and to raising the standard of living of peoples.

The shifting of resources to peaceful purposes objectively corresponds to the vital interests of all states, including socialist states. Expenditures for defense, however balanced they may be with respect to the main objective of the CPSU—a steady increase in the standard of living of the Soviet people—divert resources, of course, that could be used for the implementation of social programs and an improvement of the well-being of the people.

Military Expenditures of the NATO Countries (in billions of dollars; based on the prices and average exchange rates of 1985):

1980 - 276, 1983 - 332, 1985 - 362 (preliminary data),  
1986 - 371 (estimated)

Today, when steps have been taken on the way to real disarmament, the following key questions are becoming especially important: Is capitalism in a position to free itself from militarism and can it function economically and develop without it? To a considerable extent, the choice of specific ways and means as well as real successes in the resolution of the problems of disarmament depend upon correct and scientifically valid answers to these complex questions.

An objective analysis shows that the hypertrophied development of contemporary militarism is caused primarily by political reasons and that there are no insurmountable obstacles in the way of demilitarization. If military economics cannot exist any other way than by parasitizing the national economy, then the latter can function normally in theory and in practice without military production. In addition, by freeing itself of the numerous negative consequences of militarism, the economy would develop more quickly and more efficiently.

There is such historical experience. It is well known that the postwar "economic miracle" in Japan, West Germany and Italy took place precisely under the conditions of a low level of military expenditures.

The shifting of resources from military to peaceful purposes is not, of course, a simple matter.

One cannot, however, agree with the assertions of some politicians and scientists of Western countries that the conversion would inevitably lead to an economic decline and an increase in unemployment. The historical experience of conversion (after two world wars) and the investigations of Western and Soviet scientists as well as of UN experts show that although conversion is linked with certain complexities, it is feasible without serious negative consequences for socialist or for capitalist countries.

One indication of the possibility of conversion is the fact that the military-industrial enterprises are able to produce and do produce the most varied civilian output on a large scale. In particular, the share of peaceful output in the total value of sales of such huge military contractors as McDonnell Douglas and Rockwell International amounts to 30 and 37 percent, respectively.

#### On a Peaceful Track

In different circles of the world community, there is extensive discussion of the question of the basic principles and directions for the utilization of the resources that will be freed as a result of the reduction of arms. It is stressed that they must be used not only in national interests but also for aid to developing countries and for the resolution of global problems. In the address of M.S. Gorbachev to the participants in the International Conference on the Interrelationship Between Disarmament and Development, he noted: "To transfer to needy countries the resources that will be freed in the course of disarmament, it would be desirable to establish in the framework of the United Nations an international fund 'Disarmament for Development' open for all states. The USSR is prepared to participate in such a fund."

Disarmament and the establishment of a specific fund would permit a significant increase in the aid to young states under preferential conditions and would thus play a substantial role in the acceleration of their social and economic development. For according to UN data, today almost 1 billion people in the "Third World" live below the poverty level, 780 million do not get enough to eat, 850 million are illiterate, and 1.5 billion people have no access to medical care.

The shifting of only one-tenth of world military expenditures to the resolution of global problems and the organization of joint international actions in this area would make it possible to put an end to mass hunger, illiteracy and disease, to overcome centuries of poverty and backwardness for hundreds of millions of people, and to prevent an ecological disaster on the planet. The resources that are now being spent in the world for military purposes in just 1 day would be sufficient to finance a 10-year program to provide pure drinking water for a large part of the world's population.

The reduction of arms in the world has tremendous importance for the democratization of international economic relations and the removal of discriminating barriers in the way of the expansion of economic and scientific-technical relations, including among countries with different social systems. It is a matter of eliminating inequality of rights in trade and of removing commercial and economic, financial and credit sanctions.

The indivisibility of the contemporary world and the common interest of all peoples in stopping the senseless and wasteful arms race are clearly visible in the interrelationship between the limitation of military expenditures and world economic development.

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#### First Deputy Chief of Staff on 'New Thinking,' Military Doctrine

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No 8, Feb 88 pp 12-13

[NEW TIMES interviews Colonel General Vladimir Lobov, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff]

[Text] [Question] The Red Army was founded 70 years ago. The victory in the Great Patriotic War and the routing of fascism is a major landmark in its history. But some people in the West seem to forget this, turning the Red Army into a bogeyman. Are there any grounds for their fear?

[Answer] The myth about the aggressiveness of the Red Army is as old as the Red Army itself. When 14 states moved their troops from all sides against Soviet Russia, Western propaganda began to disseminate the lie about an "invasion by the Bolshevik hordes." Since then it has constantly intimidated people with the "red threat." The more vigorous the fight for peace and the more peace initiatives the Soviet Union advances, the more subtle are the calumnies about the aggressiveness of the Soviet Army.

Now that the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles is a real possibility, the opponents of disarmament have again turned to the subject of USSR's "superiority" in conventional weapons, tanks in particular. Moreover, our tanks are said to have fantastic performance, for instance, the ability to reach the English Channel in a matter of hours. According to Western news reports, Britain has started forming anti-tank brigades to repel a Soviet tank attack in Europe.

The "Soviet threat" is a fabrication of the military-industrial complex of the West. It is actively used to influence the population and exert pressure on governments and public opinion with the aim of maintaining arms production as a source of profits.

The real, and very dangerous, threat to peace comes from the military-industrial complex, which has a very damaging effect on the entire system of international relations.

[Question] Defence of their country and the routing of aggression have traditionally been the chief tasks of the armed forces. In our time there can be no winner in a war. How is this concept treated by the Soviet Army? Have the goals and tasks of the army changed in a society which sees the prevention of war as its most important objective?

[Answer] The first decree of the Soviet Government was the Decree on Peace. The defence of our country has traditionally been considered the paramount task of the state and its Armed Forces.

The Programme of the CPSU and the documents of the 27th Party Congress point out that there will be no winners or losers in a global armed conflict. The task of averting war becomes particularly imperative in such circumstances. This makes it essential to raise the level of discipline and responsibility among servicemen, who must maintain a high degree of vigilance and improve their combat skill and preparedness. Defence of our country is a multifaceted concept. Who will gain the upper hand—the forces of peace or the forces of war? This depends on the contribution the Soviet Army makes to the cause of preventing war.

So, there can be winners, though not in nuclear war but in the struggle to avert it. The Soviet Armed Forces today defend both their own homeland and world peace.

[Question] There are two military blocs in Europe—the Organization of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. Both blocs claim that their doctrines have a defensive character. But military confrontation is not over. In what way can the two blocs prove the sincerity of their intentions?

[Answer] Let me say first of all that the doctrinal principles of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO are not the same, and that this explains the continued military confrontation. The chief objective of the Warsaw Treaty's military doctrine is prevention of war, while NATO's military doctrine contains aggressive provisions aimed at destroying socialism as a social and political system.

"Socialism resolutely rejects war as a means of settling political and economic contradictions and ideological disputes between states," the 27th Congress of the CPSU pointed out. This determines the Soviet Union's fundamental policy of strengthening international security and peace by carrying out a complex of measures and programmes for broader international cooperation in the field of disarmament.

NATO regards war and combat operations not as an inadmissible form of interstate relations, but as a practical instrument for settling disputes and problems in its favour. This explains why NATO recognizes the U.S. concept of conflicts of high, intermediate and low intensity. To a certain extent, this concept found expression in the armed conflict unleashed by Britain against Argentina over the Falkland Islands in 1982, in the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983, the U.S. air attack on Libya, the armed intervention of France in the affairs of Chad, and other actions.

[Question] Do you see any possibility of cooperation with NATO in building a complex of confidence-building measures?

[Answer] Mikhail Gorbachev pointed to the possibility of cooperation with NATO in the provision of confidence-building measures: "We should lay our cards on the table, exchange all the data, evaluate them, clarify the asymmetry in armaments and troops, and start tackling the problems. Such is our approach."

The members of both alliances have declared that in their international relations they strictly observe the principles laid down in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. Under the Stockholm agreements, they already practise such confidence-building measures as notification of military exercises and the invitation of observers to monitor them.

The Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty states have called on NATO countries to reduce the arms and troop concentration on their contact line to a minimum agreed level, remove the most dangerous offensive weapons from this zone, set up a nuclear-free corridor along the contact line of the two blocs, and create in Europe zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons and with a lower concentration of armaments, and zones of enhanced confidence. All this is possible to achieve by mutual agreement and effort.

[Question] Democratization is perhaps the most important process now taking place in our country. It has spread to the army too. But what does democratization mean in the army?

[Answer] All the processes taking place in socialist society find their reflection in the Armed Forces as well. Perestroika in the army means a cardinal readjustment of mechanisms which have inhibited progress, the elimination of stagnant phenomena, and constructive, productive activity to improve the state of affairs in every field.

The whole complex of social relations is to be found in the army, which fully reflects the democratic character of our social system. Far from contradicting the service's regulations, democratism emphasizes the socialist nature of our Armed Forces. Of course, the process of democratization in the army and navy has its specific features,

because one-man command, discipline and the execution of orders have to be combined with broad participation by Party and Young Communist League branches and all personnel in all affairs of military units.

The basic idea of democratization is that servicemen should be trusted more and display greater initiative and independence in their activity. The responsibility for the job entrusted to servicemen is being raised too. A creative approach by servicemen to their duties, and boldness in the tackling of complex problems help in the end considerably to enhance their self-awareness.

[Question] The new political thinking is clearly reflected in the foreign policy of our country. In what way has the new thinking influenced Soviet military doctrine?

[Answer] One of the basic realities of the present-day world is that there is no acceptable alternative to peaceful coexistence between countries with opposed socio-political systems. The new thinking engendered by the modern world persistently calls for an end to the arms race and a search for ways of disarmament. These principles have found their reflection in Soviet military doctrine, which represents a system of basic views on the prevention of war and armed forces development.

Soviet military doctrine has a defensive character, with defence regarded as the principal form of military operation in repelling aggression. Proceeding from this, the Soviet Union is building up its Armed Forces on the principle of adequate defence.

Such an important doctrinal provision as renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons also accords with the new thinking. In this lies the fundamental distinction between Soviet military doctrine and NATO's doctrine, which provides for the first use of nuclear weapons under certain circumstances.

[Question] We often speak of education through historical example. How is such education conducted in the army?

[Answer] The inculcation of a cautious attitude to the past and to tradition and continuity in our historical development should occupy a special place in the training of future defenders of our country. Young people joining the army must clearly realize what they have been called upon to defend.

Our patriotism is inseparable from our history. The sources of one's love for one's country may differ, but the main thing here is unquestionably a knowledge of its history.

We have always drawn our strength from history. This was particularly evident in the years of trial that befell the Soviet people. This continuity was strikingly revealed during the Great Patriotic War. It is no accident

that the orders of Alexander Nevsky, Bogdan Khmelnitsky, Suvorov, Kutuzov, Ushakov and Nakhimov were instituted in those stern years.

Education through historical example and the heroic past, through revolutionary and combat traditions, should determine our whole approach in training the present generation of defenders of our country.

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**Karpov Interviewed on INF, START, SDI,  
European Issues**

52001061 Moscow *NEW TIMES* in English  
No 10, Mar 88 pp 5-7

[*NEW TIMES* correspondent Konstantin Isakov talks to Victor Karpov, chief of the Arms Limitation and Disarmament Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.]

[Text] *NEW TIMES*: While the INF treaty is still pending ratification by the USSR Supreme Soviet and the U.S. Congress, with the world public looking on in eager anticipation, the Soviet Union has already started to pull out its intermediate-range missiles from the GDR and Czechoslovakia. The new thinking has once again made itself felt in world politics. But is there a limit to good will?

Victor Karpov: Of course there is, and it is determined by the interests of the security of our country and that of our allies. We cannot go beyond this limit. But the Soviet Union has never refused to work actively within it.

The withdrawal of the SS-12 missiles from the territories of the GDR and Czechoslovakia, along with launching installations and auxiliary equipment, which began on 25 February and will end in March, shows that the Soviet Union is remaining true to its course. This long-awaited withdrawal must become another brick in the edifice of our common European home. Readiness to promote its construction does not depend on whether at a given moment our partners are taking similar action. The situation is developing in such a way as to ensure that the INF treaty, judging by everything, will be ratified. And the Soviet Government's decision proves that the USSR is prepared to implement it.

N.T.: A highlight in world events was U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz's first visit to Moscow in late February since the signing of the INF treaty, and the first one this year, in preparation for a Moscow summit. What would you say about the results of the talks?

V.K.: I would say the main feature of the talks was that they were a logical extension of the Washington meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, a follow-up of the line set out in the joint statement on its results. It is not only a question of preparing the agreements that could be described as a 50 percent cut in

strategic offensive weapons. There is a broader meaning: How can the USSR and the United States, having started to reduce and eliminate nuclear arms, ensure strategic stability in relations between the two countries, and make this process irreversible?

For this it is essential that the 1972 ABM treaty, around which the entire process of limiting and cutting back the strategic arms of the two countries revolves, should remain in force in an unchanged form. Then, together with the Americans, we have to start thinking: what next? What should be the next step towards ensuring the continuation of the process of cooperation between the USSR and the United States in reducing the nuclear threat, abolishing chemical weapons and cutting back conventional arms? We saw the Secretary of State's visit as the touchstone of the American administration's intentions.

Before the visit, we were put on our guard by the behavior of the American delegation in Geneva. It was going back on many of the agreements reached in Washington. The impression was that the Americans had lost interest in the constructive preparation of the text of a SOA treaty and other documents needed for signing in Moscow. But the Secretary of State arrived in a somewhat different mood, one which I would describe as businesslike, as can be judged from the results of his talks with Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze.

On the whole his visit was useful. We discussed a wide range of regional and humanitarian problems. What is particularly important from the point of view of the future of our relations, in my opinion, is the Secretary of State's readiness to give full and concise legal form to the agreements reached in Washington—to observe the ABM treaty as it was signed in 1972 for an agreed term. Up till then the American delegation in Geneva had failed to take a constructive stand on this issue. The Moscow talks showed that our partners evidently are prepared in future to work in Geneva in a more businesslike spirit.

N.T.: How would you explain the difference in the stand taken by Shultz and by the American delegation in Geneva? Is there anything behind that?

V.K.: Of course, one could start surmising as to what lies behind the unconstructive stand taken by the American representatives in Geneva. But I think the key is not in the American delegation itself, but in the overall situation in the United States in a presidential election year. It is characterized by lack of clarity about the future, sometimes a deliberate ambiguity about the stand taken by the different political forces. It is also important for the U.S. administration, which links its hopes of carrying on its policy with the election of a Republican President, to know what is likely to help it and what is not. Apparently, since the Washington summit, serious changes have taken place in the Republican political kitchen which determines the further policy of the

Republican Party. And that presumably led to Shultz receiving certain powers—for all we can hopefully tell. President Reagan's WASHINGTON POST interview of 26 February was at variance with what the Secretary of State had said. The President voiced his doubts whether there would be enough time to get the Strategic Offensive Arms treaty ready for signing during his Moscow visit, but did not strike this item off the agenda.

The INF treaty signed in Washington last 8 December is receiving increasing support in the United States. That is evident from the public opinion polls and the mood of the Senate. The small group of Senators that oppose it seems to be in isolation. Even some of the legislators who were initially sceptical or hostile to the treaty are now changing their attitude under pressure from the electorate.

N.T.: Can one now hope for changes in the American position at the Geneva talks?

V.K.: I think it would be premature to make any forecasts. The main criteria for us is whether any real progress is made within the next month, i.e., before the next meeting between the Soviet Foreign Minister and the American Secretary of State in Washington, whether or not we advance in the preparation of the draft agreements on SOA. If we lose this month, we can lose the chance of signing them.

N.T.: The question of drafting a treaty on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms [SOA] was touched on in the talks between General Secretary Gorbachev and Secretary of State Shultz. The view was expressed that such a treaty required much more complex verification procedures than those for the INF. Could you explain that?

V.K.: Procedures for the verification of the liquidation of those armaments that are to be cut represent an objective difficulty as they cover much more ground than intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. Better inspection will be required. But given political will of the two sides, these questions can be resolved in keeping with each side's interests and to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty itself.

I should like to point out that the Gorbachev-Shultz talks touched on a whole series of questions of principled significance from the point of view of prospects of stability in Soviet-American relations. It is essential to do away with the atmosphere of mutual suspicion and mistrust which, it must be admitted, existed between us until recently. That can only be done through a combination of measures that would lead to reducing military confrontation and promoting greater trust and openness in relations between our two countries.

N.T.: The ratification debates on the INF treaty in the USSR and U.S.A. legislative bodies have aroused wide international discussion on the issue of European

defence and possible changes in NATO strategy. In the West the idea of "compensation" is seen as the sole alternative, although there is not a word about it in the Washington agreements. And the Moscow talks showed that other possible solutions exist. So how should one view the idea of "compensation"? Is it a mere declaration, albeit a dangerous one, or is it taking practical shape?

V.K.: I think the statements coming from the various NATO countries should be taken seriously. Behind them lie trends, often contradictory, but which could complicate the situation, particularly in Europe. The idea of "compensation" is basically wrong. But to say that the West is unanimous in its views and regards it as the sole alternative would be a mistake. We know of deep-lying differences in the assessment of the INF treaty in West European government circles. The elimination of two classes of nuclear weapon in Europe is an unprecedented event on our continent. Consequently there can be no precedent for the reaction of European governments. The problems of getting down to disarmament in practice have proved anything but easy for many West European politicians. But does that mean that an arms race is inevitable? Probably not. There are increasing signs that the plans for rearmament and "compensation" are not getting substantial support, particularly in the GDR, where the wish is being expressed not to be content with what had been achieved, but to go further.

In the ruling quarters of Federal Germany we are witnessing a determination to move ahead with the reduction and elimination of shorter-range nuclear weapons. The West German delegation at the Geneva Disarmament Conference is taking an active part in drafting a convention on the banning and abolition of chemical weapons. The question has been raised of carrying out the agreement reached earlier to remove American chemical weapons from West German soil. Yet only recently it would have been hard to imagine Bonn making such a move.

Other trends, too, are noticeable. France, for example, is especially concerned about the fate of its own nuclear arsenal. Differences are to be observed among the political forces at the Vienna talks, where 23 NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries are drawing up a mandate for talks on a reduction in conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

N.T.: Could you give us some idea of what to expect at the talks in Vienna in the future?

V.K.: For a start, as the Soviet Union is suggesting, the conference could consider the elimination of all imbalances in conventional armaments and armed forces and then to bring them down to a level that would rule out any possibility of offensive operations. Such a course of

events, taken in conjunction with the abolition of short-range nuclear weapons, would change the situation on the continent, making it entirely different from what we have today. That frightens some people.

A number of issues have already been agreed on at the Vienna consultations. For instance, the aim of the talks has been defined. But there remain questions on the differences that still have to be ironed out. The main one is on the subject covered by the talks. As military technology in the field of conventional armaments advances, things have reached a stage where the greater part of the arsenals of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries consists of dual-purpose weapons (some less so, others more). Take artillery. Starting from 152-mm guns, both conventional and nuclear shells can be used. The tactical air force can also carry both types. And it looks as if it will soon be possible to equip tanks with nuclear artillery. So the classic concept of conventional weapons no longer holds. The Warsaw Treaty countries want all armaments that could use both conventional and nuclear shells to be covered by the talks. The official NATO stand (although differences in individual views exist) is that no mention of nuclear weapons should be made in the mandate. The French are particularly active on this issue. They regard all their nuclear weapons as strategic or pre-strategic rather than shorter-range. Therefore, in their view, they should not be a subject of negotiations. In my opinion, other NATO representatives are using the French position as a pretext for delaying the drafting of a mandate.

The task now is to find a reasonable compromise between extreme points of view. That is what the Warsaw Treaty countries are trying to do. We have agreed that the nuclear component, i.e., the shells and nuclear bombs, should at this stage be left out of the mandate now being prepared. It would authorize the participants in the talks to reduce only the carriers. As for the nuclear components, they could be the subject of separate talks. In principle, the West agrees to such an approach. All that is now needed is a mutually-acceptable formula.

There are also problems pertaining to the zone to which reductions would apply. For instance, would island territories be included or, say, the Asian part of Turkey? We also have to establish the connection with Stockholm-2, that is, the follow-up of the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, with the talks of the 23 NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries.

N.T.: What do you think of the talks, likewise in Vienna, that have been under way for almost 15 years on a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe? Are they still going on?

V.K.: They are still alive, and it would be wrong to discount them. The questions they are discussing are of considerable significance for Central Europe, where the confrontation of the blocs is felt most. Of course the

absence of progress and prospects for agreement do warrant concern, in view of the preparation of new talks embracing all of Europe. But we hope that the drafting of a mandate for European talks will touch on the centre of the continent as well. So it seems that some way of combining the two will be found.

N.T.: The magazine receives a great many letters from both Soviet and foreign readers who are worried that the Soviet Union, now busy cutting back on nuclear missiles, might have lost its vigilance with regard to SDI. What would you say to them?

V.K.: The question of SDI is really a question of what the United States wants from the point of view of strategic stability in our relations, whether it wants a continuation of the arms race or a lower level of nuclear confrontation; whether it wants the problems connected with surprise attacks, war as a result of technical mishaps or miscalculations removed from the agenda. The SDI programme is an index of how seriously the United States takes the Soviet Union.

And the American administration has taken an ambiguous stand. On the one hand, Washington wants agreement on a 50 percent cut in strategic offensive arms and understands that this cannot be achieved without abiding by the ABM treaty. This understanding was reflected in the Washington agreements and during Mr Shultz's visit to Moscow. But on the other hand, the American President, who put forward the idea of SDI back in 1983, has painted himself into a corner on the issue. So some

tactical manoeuvring is going to be necessary, for it is recognized that unless the implementation of SDI is suspended for a sufficiently long time, there will be neither strategic offensive arms reduction nor stability in our relations. The "star wars" programme is certainly a major element in the strategic equation of Soviet-American relations. There is another element as well—the possible countermeasures we may take to SDI. The response could be asymmetrical, making the programme worthless from the military point of view. But we should not like to get involved in a wasteful SDI-anti-SDI race. It would be much more sensible and promising to pursue the course of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons, excluding them altogether from the strategic equation.

In other words, we are not becoming less vigilant about SDI. But we do believe that compliance with the ABM treaty will make it possible to put through intermediary measures that will bring about greater stability. And when a 50 percent cut is made in strategic offensive weapons, when the new situation has emerged, then one can better assess the prospects of strategic relations between the USSR and the United States. We are convinced that the key to a system of relations capable of ensuring peace and cooperation between our two countries, to an all-embracing system of peace and security, lies in carrying on the nuclear disarmament process, eliminating other weapons of mass destruction, reducing troops and armaments—rather than adding a new dimension to the arms race. This is the road to follow till the end of the century—and further on.

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## AUSTRIA

### Foreign Minister Addresses Geneva Disarmament Conference

AU151442 Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG in German  
15 Apr 88 p 1

[Excerpt] Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Dr Mock yesterday proposed Vienna as the seat to control the observance of an aspired convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Mock was the first Austrian foreign minister to address the UN Disarmament Conference in Geneva. The objective of the conference is a convention on a prohibition of chemical weapons.

Mock again proposed Austria's candidacy for a membership in the Disarmament Conference for which it has striven for years. In a transition period the country, which presently has an observer status, should be given the opportunity to cooperate, Mock said.

Referring to the present Vienna CSCE follow-on conference, he stated that the progress so far is "less than encouraging." However, he expressed confidence that an agreement will be reached on a document that could lead to the breakthrough of the Helsinki Final Act and promote further positive development.

Mock welcomed the 1987 INF Treaty between the two superpowers on the global elimination of intermediate-range missiles. Moreover, he condemned the use of chemical weapons, while pointing out that victims of attacks with such weapons are being treated in Austrian hospitals.

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

### Honecker Invites FDP to East Berlin NFZ Meeting

LD211235 Hamburg DPA in German  
1130 GMT 21 Apr 88

[Text] Bonn, (DPA)—SED General Secretary Erich Honecker has invited FDP chairman Martin Bangemann or a delegation of the Free Democrats to an "international meeting for nuclear weapons-free zones" to be held in East Berlin from 20 to 22 June. FDP spokesman Lothar Mahling said today that the invitation is contained in a letter from Honecker which the GDR's permanent representative in Bonn, Ewald Moldt, handed to Bangemann yesterday.

In the letter Honecker says that at the meeting there should be joint discussion of how the disarmament process can be advanced and promoted. According to

Mahling, in one of its next sittings, the FDP Presidium will discuss whether to accept the invitation. In Bonn it is expected that the other Bundestag parties will also receive similar invitations from the SED leader.

## UNITED KINGDOM

### Negotiators Cautioned Against Rushing Arms Pact

52500018 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 25 Mar 88 p 22

[Text] "We don't want anyone negotiating against a deadline because that way you come up with a bad agreement," remarked President Reagan last week on the eve of the talks in Washington between his Secretary of State, Mr George Shultz, and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr Eduard Shevardnadze. Amen to that. The talks ended yesterday by setting May 29 as the date for President Reagan's visit to Moscow, whether or not agreement is reached for a cut of up to a half in strategic arms stockpiles on both sides.

The visit will be historic, the first during the eight-year presidency of the man who set America on its biggest arms buildup in recent history and, bucking predictions that this would accelerate the arms race, thus forced the Soviet Union to agree to the first-ever cuts in nuclear arsenals. It will also mark American recognition of the fact that Mr Gorbachev really does represent something different—a Soviet Union ready to accept that the emphasis of superpower competition in the next century should be switched from arms to a less dangerous and wasteful contest for economic power and influence. The Moscow summit will set the seal on a departing American leader whose contribution to reducing world tensions is often underrated, just as it will give a boost to a process of Soviet reform which, however troubled, is clearly moving in the right direction.

It is clearly important that the strategic arms deal should not be rushed. Verification of cuts in strategic weapons, which involve sea-based missiles and mobile ones on land, is much more complex than in the medium-range missile agreement last year. The Russians, encouragingly, seem not to be insisting that the Americans tie a strategic arms deal to restrictions on their Star Wars programme, although this linkage could yet be resurrected (it is probably unnecessary as there is no congressional enthusiasm for Star Wars). President Reagan has indicated that he is ready to go to Moscow again this year if necessary to sign a strategic weapons treaty. The May visit will have served its purpose if it shows the world that superpower relations are on the most hopeful new footing since 1945.

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